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Assessment of the risk of SARS-CoV-2 reinfection in an 
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Summary: In a cohort of 133,266 laboratory-confirmed cases, SARS-CoV-2 risk of 
reinfection was 0.02% and incidence rate of reinfection was 0.36 per 10,000 person-weeks. 















Background: Risk of reinfection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) is unknown. We assessed risk and incidence rate of documented SARS-CoV-
2 reinfection in a cohort of laboratory-confirmed cases in Qatar. 
Methods: All SARS-CoV-2 laboratory-confirmed cases with at least one PCR positive swab 
that is ≥45 days after a first-positive swab were individually investigated for evidence of 
reinfection, and classified as showing strong, good, some, or weak/no evidence for 
reinfection. Viral genome sequencing of the paired first-positive and reinfection viral 
specimens was conducted to confirm reinfection. Risk and incidence rate of reinfection were 
estimated.  
Results: Out of 133,266 laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases, 243 persons (0.18%) had 
at least one subsequent positive swab ≥45 days after the first-positive swab. Of these, 54 
cases (22.2%) had strong or good evidence for reinfection. Median time between first and 
reinfection swab was 64.5 days (range: 45-129). Twenty-three of the 54 cases (42.6%) were 
diagnosed at a health facility suggesting presence of symptoms, while 31 (57.4%) were 
identified incidentally through random testing campaigns/surveys or contact tracing. Only 
one person was hospitalized at time of reinfection, but was discharged the next day. No 
deaths were recorded. Viral genome sequencing confirmed four reinfections out of 12 cases 
with available genetic evidence. Reinfection risk was estimated at 0.02% (95% CI: 0.01-
0.02%) and reinfection incidence rate at 0.36 (95% CI: 0.28-0.47) per 10,000 person-weeks. 
Conclusions: SARS-CoV-2 reinfection can occur but is a rare phenomenon suggestive of 
protective immunity against reinfection that lasts for at least a few months post primary 
infection. 













The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been spreading 
around the globe causing severe disruptions to social and economic activities [1-3]. Qatar, a 
peninsula in the Arabian Gulf region with a diverse population of 2.8 million [4, 5], has 
experienced a large epidemic with one of the highest laboratory-confirmed rates of infection 
at >60,000 infections per million population [6-8]. Antibody testing and mathematical 
modeling indicated that about half of the population has already been infected [6, 8-12].  
The intensity of the epidemic with a high risk of re-exposure to the infection, as well as the 
availability of a centralized data-capture system of all laboratory-confirmed infections, 
provided an opportunity to epidemiologically assess the presence and incidence of 
reinfections; a poorly-understood feature of SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology whose elucidation is 
critical to inform global response, timing and intensity of future cycles, and impact and 
durability of potential vaccines [13-16]. 
Our aim was to assess the risk and incidence rate of documented reinfection in a cohort of 
133,266 SARS-CoV-2 laboratory-confirmed infected persons. Since the relevant underlying 
question is whether risk of reinfection is appreciable or not, we implemented a conservative 
epidemiological approach for assessing documented reinfections, that is prone to 
overestimate rather than underestimate risk of reinfection. However, we also conducted 
sensitivity analyses implementing more stringent criteria for assessing reinfection. We further 














Sources of data  
We analyzed the centralized and standardized national SARS-CoV-2 testing and 
hospitalization database compiled at Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), the main public 
healthcare provider and nationally-designated provider for Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19) healthcare needs. The database covers all SARS-CoV-2 cases in Qatar and 
encompasses data on all polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing conducted from February 
28-August 12, 2020, including testing of suspected SARS-CoV-2 cases and traced contacts 
and infection surveillance testing. The database further includes data on hospital admission of 
COVID-19 patients and the World Health Organization (WHO) severity classification for 
each infection [17], which is assessed through individual chart reviews by trained medical 
personnel. Recently, data on serological testing for antibody on residual blood specimens 
collected for routine clinical care from attendees at HMC were also incorporated [6, 10].  
Laboratory methods  
All PCR testing was conducted at HMC Central Laboratory or at Sidra Medicine Laboratory, 
following standardized protocols. Nasopharyngeal and/or oropharyngeal swabs 
(Huachenyang Technology, China) were collected and placed in Universal Transport 
Medium (UTM). Aliquots of UTM were: extracted on the QIAsymphony platform 
(QIAGEN, USA) and tested with real-time reverse-transcription PCR (RT-qPCR) using 
TaqPath™ COVID-19 Combo Kit (100% sensitivity and specificity [18]; Thermo Fisher 
Scientific, USA) on ABI 7500 FAST (Thermo Fisher, USA); extracted using a custom 
protocol [19] on Hamilton Microlab STAR (Hamilton, USA) and tested using 
AccuPower SARS-CoV-2 Real-Time RT-PCR Kit (100% sensitivity and specificity [20]; 












assayed with cobas® SARS-CoV-2 Test (95% sensitivity, 100% specificity [21]; Roche, 
Switzerland). The first assay targets the virus’ S, N, and ORF1ab regions; the second targets 
the virus’ RdRp and E-gene regions; and the third targets the ORF1ab and E-gene regions. 
Serological testing was performed using Roche Elecsys
®
 Anti-SARS-CoV-2 (99.5% 
sensitivity [22], 99.8% specificity [22, 23]; Roche, Switzerland), 
an electrochemiluminescence immunoassay that uses a recombinant protein representing the 
nucleocapsid (N) antigen for determination of antibodies against SARS-CoV-2. Qualitative 
anti-SARS-CoV-2 results were generated following the manufacturer’s instructions (reactive: 
cutoff index for optical density ≥1.0 vs. non-reactive: cutoff index <1.0).  
Inclusion criteria 
All SARS-CoV-2 laboratory-confirmed cases with at least one PCR positive swab that is ≥45 
days after a first-positive swab were considered as suspected cases of reinfection. The 45-day 
cutoff was informed by data from observational cohorts of SARS-CoV-2 infected persons 
[24, 25], and was set to account for the duration of prolonged PCR positivity of several weeks 
in these patients. Cutoff determination was further informed by the distribution of the time 
difference between the first-positive swab and subsequent positive swabs among SARS-CoV-
2 cases with multiple swabs (Figure 1). The tail of this distribution indicates that a cutoff of 
45 days (at the 99
th
 p rcentile) provides an appropriate mark for defining the end of 
prolonged PCR positivity: a subsequent positive swab within 45 days of the first-positive 
swab is likely to reflect prolonged PCR positivity (due to non-viable virus fragments) rather 













Suspected reinfection case classification 
Suspected cases of reinfection, that is cases fitting above indicated inclusion criteria, were 
classified as showing either strong evidence, good evidence, some evidence, or weak (or no) 
evidence for reinfection (Box 1). Classification was based on holistic quantitative and 
qualitative criteria applied to each investigated case. Criteria included the pattern and 
magnitude of the change in PCR cycle threshold (Ct) value across repeated swabs, time 
interval between subsequent swabs, PCR testing site (such as outpatients at primary care, 
hospital emergency, or inpatient hospitalization), purpose of PCR testing (such as appearance 
of symptoms, contact tracing, or survey/testing campaign), age, history of COVID-19-related 
hospital admission, and case severity per WHO classification [17]. 
Overall, swabs with Ct <30 (suggestive of recent active infection) at least 45 days after the 
first-positive swab were considered as showing strong evidence for reinfection. Swabs with 
Ct ≥30 at least 45 days after the first-positive swab were considered as showing good 
evidence for reinfection if PCR positivity was associated with contextual evidence supporting 
the status of “reinfection” including appearance of symptoms (often as proxied by being 
diagnosed at a health facility), if the infection was diagnosed through contact tracing 
(indicating recent exposure to an infected person), if the change in Ct value from the last 
swab was to a lower Ct value (indicating increasing viral load), and/or if the repeated 
swabbing did not follow a regular pattern and time interval between repeated swabs was not 
short (to exclude cases under clinical management that are indicative of poor control of first 
infection).  
Shorter durations bordering the 45-day cutoff with Ct values ≥30 and no contextual evidence 
supporting the status of “reinfection” were indicative of some evidence for reinfection, but 
not strong nor good evidence for reinfection, as they are more likely to reflect the long tail of 












on hospitalized patients, and severe or critical WHO disease classifications were considered 
as contextual factors indicative of poor control of the first infection rather than reinfection. 
Cases that had such contextual factors (and implicitly did not fit the criteria of strong, good, 
or some evidence for reinfection) were considered to have weak (or no) evidence for 
reinfection.  
Of note that hospitalized COVID-19 cases often had multiple subsequent swabs administered 
to them as part of clinical care, and repeated swabbing was standard earlier in the epidemic, 
as the criteria for discharge from an isolation facility required at least two subsequent PCR 
negative swabs. This was changed later to a time-based criteria per updated WHO 
recommendation [26]. 
Reinfection risk and rate 
Documented reinfection risk was assessed by quantifying the proportion of cases with strong 
or good evidence for reinfection out of all laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases that 
were diagnosed ≥45 days from end-of-study censoring. Incidence rate of documented 
reinfection was calculated by dividing the number of cases with strong or good evidence by 
the number of person-weeks contributed by all laboratory-confirmed cases who had their 
first-positive swab ≥45 days before day of analysis. The follow-up person-time was 
calculated starting from 45 days after the first-positive swab and up to the reinfection swab, 
all-cause death, or end-of-study censoring.  
Sensitivity analyses 
Since we implemented a conservative approach prone to overestimate risk of documented 
reinfection, several sensitivity analyses were conducted implementing more stringent criteria 
for assessing reinfection: 1) exclusion of cases where the Ct value for the first and/or 












positive cases), 2) changing the ≥45-day cutoff to a ≥60-day cutoff to further exclude 
potential cases of long-term prolonged PCR positivity, and (most stringent) 3) setting 
definition of recent active infection at Ct cutoff value of <25 (instead of <30) and excluding 
any suspected reinfection case with Ct >25. 
Viral genome sequencing and analysis 
Viral genome sequencing was conducted on retrieved paired samples of the first-positive 
swab and reinfection swab for patients with strong or good evidence for reinfection as 
confirmatory analysis. Further details about the viral genome sequencing methods can be 
found in Supplementary Text S1.  
Ethical approval 
Study was approved by HMC and Weill Cornell Medicine-Qatar Institutional Review Boards. 
RESULTS 
Epidemiological analysis 
Figure 2 illustrates the selection process of SARS-CoV-2 eligible cases and summarizes the 
results of their reinfection status’ evaluation. Out of 133,266 laboratory-confirmed cases, 
117,458 had only one single positive swab and thus were excluded from further analysis. Of 
the remaining 15,808 cases with multiple swabs, only 243 persons had at least one 
subsequent positive swab that is ≥45 days from the first-positive swab, and thus qualified for 
inclusion in analysis. 
There were 299 positive swabs collected ≥45 days after the first-positive swab for these 243 
persons. Individual investigation of each of these swabs yielded 54 cases with strong or good 
evidence for reinfection. Of these, 35 had strong evidence for reinfection (Ct <30) while the 
remaining 19 had good evidence for reinfection (Ct ≥30). An additional 26 cases showed 












Table 1 shows the characteristics of the 54 cases classified as showing strong or good 
evidence for reinfection. Almost all cases were males, but this reflects the focus of the 
epidemic in craft and manual workers [6]. Median age was 33 years (range: 16-57) and 
median time between the first swab and the reinfection swab was 64.5 days (range: 45-129). 
Median Ct value was 28 (range: 14-37): it was 22 (range 14-29) for the 35 swabs classified 
with strong evidence (Ct <30) and 32 (range: 30-37) for the remaining swabs (Ct ≥30). 
Twenty-three cases (42.6%) were diagnosed at a health facility, suggesting presence of 
symptoms while 31 (57.4%) were identified incidentally either through random testing 
campaigns/surveys (n=15; 27.8%) or contact tracing (n=16; 29.6%), suggesting minimal 
symptoms if any.  
Nine of the 54 cases showing strong or good evidence for reinfection were hospitalized at any 
time. However, all but one occurred following the primary infection—only one 
hospitalization occurred at time of reinfection but the patient was discharged the next day. 
Most hospitalizations occurred for isolation or initial assessment purposes as cases had no or 
minimal symptoms. Only one case had sufficient symptoms to warrant an infection severity 
assessment (during primary infection), but was classified with “mild” severity per WHO 
classification. No deaths were recorded. Of note that the vast majority of infections in Qatar 
occurred in young and healthy men and had low severity [6, 12].  
Antibody test results were available for 48 out of the 243 assessed individuals 
(Supplementary Table S1), of whom 30 (62.5%) had detectable antibodies. Of the 13 with 
strong evidence for reinfection and available antibody results, seven (53.9%) were sero-
negative. Meanwhile, both individuals with good evidence for reinfection, three of the four 
individuals with some evidence for reinfection, and 19 of the 29 individuals with weak 












Risk of documented reinfection was estimated at 0.05% (95% CI: 0.04-0.07%)—that is a 
total of 54 reinfections among 101,349 persons with laboratory-confirmed infection (the 
cohort of infected persons after excluding persons who were diagnosed within 45 days from 
end-of-study censoring). Incidence rate of reinfection was estimated at 1.09 (95% CI: 0.84-
1.42) per 10,000 person-weeks—that is a total of 54 reinfection events in a follow-up person-
time of 495,208.7 person-weeks.   
Results of sensitivity analyses can be found in Supplementary Table S2. In these analyses, the 
estimate for the risk of reinfection ranged between 0.02% (95% CI: 0.01-0.03) and 0.03% 
(95% CI: 0.02-0.04), while that for the incidence rate of reinfection ranged between 0.38 
(95% CI: 0.24-0.60) and 1.06 (95% CI: 0.75-1.50) per 10,000 person-weeks. Although these 
sensitivity analyses confirmed our results, they suggested overestimation of the already low 
risk of reinfection.  
Confirmation of reinfection through viral genome sequencing 
Paired specimens of the first-positive and reinfection swabs could be retrieved for 23 out of 
the 54 cases with strong or good evidence for reinfection. Table 2 summarizes the viral 
genome sequencing results and Figure 3 and Supplementary Figures S1-S2 show the detailed 
analysis for each genome pair.  
There was insufficient evidence to warrant interpretation for 11 pairs because of low genome 
quality. For six pairs, there were one to several changes of allele frequency indicative at best 
of a shifting balance of quasi-species, and thus no evidence for reinfection. For two pairs, 
remarkably, there was conclusive evidence for no reinfection as both genomes were of high 
quality yet no differences were found. For both patients, Ct was <25 for the first-positive and 
reinfection swabs indicating persistent active infection (Table 1). These two cases were also 












Meanwhile, for two pairs, there was conclusive evidence for reinfection with multiple 
changes of allele frequency and presence of the D614G mutation (23403bp A>G)—a variant 
that appeared and expanded replacing the original D614 form [27, 28]. Also for two pairs, 
and although one of the genomes was of inferior quality, there was sufficient evidence for 
differences including the presence of the D614G mutation, thereby rendering evidence for 
reinfection. Three out of these four cases with viral genome sequencing confirmation of 
reinfection were classified above (epidemiological criteria) as having strong evidence for 
reinfection, with the fourth classified as having good evidence (Table 1). Antibody test result 
was available for one case at time of reinfection, and the individual was sero-negative.    
In sum, for the 12 cases where viral genome sequencing evidence was available, four cases 
were confirmed as reinfections, a confirmation rate of 33.3%. Applying this rate to the above-
estimated reinfection metrics yielded risk of documented reinfection of 0.02% (95% CI: 0.01-
0.02%) and incidence rate of reinfection of 0.36 (95% CI: 0.28-0.47) per 10,000 person-
weeks.  
DISCUSSION 
Results indicate, employing several analyses and sensitivity analyses, conclusive evidence for 
presence of reinfections in the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic of Qatar, but the risk for documented 
reinfection was very rare at about 2 reinfections per 10,000 infected persons. This finding is 
striking as the epidemic in Qatar has been intense with half of the population estimated to 
have been infected [6, 8-12]. Considering the strength of the force of infection, estimated at a 
daily probability of infection exceeding 1% at the epidemic peak around May 20 [6], it is all 
but certain that a significant proportion of the population has been repeatedly exposed to the 












Indeed, of all epidemiologically-identified reinfections, nearly two-thirds (57%) were 
discovered accidentally, either through random testing campaigns/surveys or through contact 
tracing. None were severe, critical, or fatal; all reinfections were asymptomatic or with 
minimal or mild symptoms. These findings may suggest that most infected persons appear to 
develop immunity against reinfection that lasts for at least few months, and that reinfections 
(if they occur) are well tolerated and no more symptomatic than primary infections. Further 
follow up of this cohort of infected persons over time may allow elucidation of potential 
effects of waning of immunity. 
Other lines of evidence for this cohort also support this conclusion. Among 2,559 PCR 
positive persons where an antibody test outcome was available [6], and where the first-
positive PCR test was conducted >3 weeks before the serology test to accommodate for the 
delay in development of detectable antibodies following o set of infection [24, 25], 91.7% 
were antibody positive [6]. The high antibody positivity was also stable for over three months 
[6], as described elsewhere [14, 25]. The epidemic curve in Qatar was further characterized 
by rapid growth followed by rapid decline [6, 8, 12], at a time when levels of social and 
physical distancing restrictions were fairly stable. This points to susceptibles-infected-
recovered “SIR” epidemic dynamics with most infections eliciting immunity against 
reinfection.          
This assessment has limitations. We assessed risk of only documented reinfections, but other 
reinfections could have occurred but went undocumented, perhaps because of minimal/mild 
or no symptoms. It is also possible that with the primed immune system following primary 
infection, reinfections could be milder and shorter [15]. A recent nationwide population-
based survey in Qatar estimated that only 9.3% (95% CI: 7.9-11.0%) of those antibody 
positive had a prior documented laboratory-confirmed infection [9], suggesting that 












infections (or reinfections). This finding indicates that incidence rate of both documented and 
undocumented reinfections may add up to perhaps ~10 per 10,000 person-weeks. Meanwhile, 
a recent mathematical modeling study estimated the incidence rate of infection in Qatar at the 
time of the present study, including both documented and undocumented infections, at ~200 
per 10,000 person-weeks [8]. Comparing these incidence rates suggest that the “efficacy” of 
natural infection against reinfection is around 1 10 200 95%  . 
Viral genome sequencing analysis was possible for only a subset of reinfections. Antibody 
testing outcomes were also available for only a number of cases, limiting use and inferences 
of the link between antibody status and risk of reinfection. Of note that for one of the 
genetically-confirmed reinfections the antibody test result was available but was sero-
negative (Table 1), just as the Hong Kong reinfected patient [29].  
In conclusion, SARS-CoV-2 reinfection appears to be a rare phenomenon. This may suggest 
that immunity develops after the primary infection and lasts for at least few months, and that 
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Box 1. Classification of suspected cases of SARS-CoV-2 reinfection based on strength of 
supporting epidemiological evidence. 
Suspected cases of SARS-CoV-2 reinfection: all laboratory-confirmed cases with at least one polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) positive swab that is ≥45 days after a first-positive swab. 
Strong evidence for reinfection: individuals having positive swabs with PCR cycle threshold (Ct) value <30 at 
least 45 days after the first-positive swab. No contextual evidence supporting poor control of first infection such 
as age ≥70 years, repeated swabs on hospitalized patients, and severe or critical World Health Organization 
disease classifications. 
Good evidence for reinfection: individuals having positive swabs with PCR Ct value ≥30 at least 45 days after 
the first-positive swab, but where PCR positivity was associated with contextual evidence supporting the status 
of reinfection: 
 Appearance of symptoms (often as proxied by being diagnosed at a health facility) 
 Infection diagnosis through contact tracing (indicating recent exposure to an infected person) 
 Lower Ct value compared to last positive swab (indicating increasing viral load) 
 Irregular and spaced-out pattern for repeated swabbing (to exclude cases under clinical management that 
are indicative of poor control of first infection).  
No contextual evidence supporting poor control of first infection such as age ≥70 years, repeated swabs on 
hospitalized patients, and severe or critical World Health Organization disease classifications.  
Some evidence for reinfection: individuals having positive swabs with PCR Ct value ≥30 at least 45 days after 
the first-positive swab, but typically bordering the cutoff of 45 days. PCR positivity was not associated with 
evidence supporting the status of reinfection (listed above). 
Weak evidence for reinfection: individuals having swabs with PCR Ct value ≥30 at least 45 days after the first-
positive swab, but typically bordering the cutoff of 45 days. PCR positivity was associated with contextual 
evidence indicative of poor infection control of the first infection rather than reinfection (such as age ≥70 years, 

















Figure 1. Distribution of the time difference between the first swab and subsequent swabs 
among all laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases with more than one positive swab. The 
cutoff of 45 days was at the 99
th
 percentile, and thus provides an appropriate mark for 
defining the end of the prolonged polymerase chain reaction (PCR) positivity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow chart describing the selection process of SARS-CoV-2 eligible cases and 
summarizing the results of their reinfection status’ evaluation.  
 
 
Figure 3. Viral genome sequencing analysis of the paired viral specimens of the first-positive 
and reinfection swabs for the six patients with conclusive or supporting evidence for 



















Table 1. Characteristics of individuals classified as showing strong or good evidence for reinfection.  
 Socio-demographic PCR testing Hospitalization  Ab testing 
ID# Sex Age 
group 













Strong evidence for reinfection 
1 Male 50-54 Survey‡ 14 May First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 50-54 Survey‡ 23 July Reinf swab 14 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 26 July Negative 
2 Male 30-34 Health facility 16 June First pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Health facility 10 August Reinf swab 16 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
3 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 02 April First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ 07 April 1 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 26 June Reinf swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 27 June Negative 
4 Male 25-29 Health facility 30 April First pos swab 33 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Health facility 15 July Reinf swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
5 Male 35-39 Contact tracing 31 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Health facility 20 April Subs pos swab 24 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Health facility 07 August Reinf swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
6 Female 50-54 Contact tracing 04 June First pos swab 34 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Female 50-54 Health facility 27 July Reinf swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 14 July Negative 
7 Female 20-24 Health facility 26 April First pos swab 35 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Female 20-24 Health facility 19 July Reinf swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
8 Male 30-34 Health facility 05 June First pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 04 August Reinf swab 18 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
9 Male 20-24 Contact tracing 03 April First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Health facility 09 July Reinf swab 18 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
10 Female 20-24 Health facility 24 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Female 20-24 Contact tracing 23 June Reinf swab 19 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
11 Male 35-39 Contact tracing 30 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Contact tracing 24 June Reinf swab 19 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 19 July Positive 
12 Female 45-49 Health facility 28 May First pos swab 30 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Female 45-49 Health facility 10 August Reinf swab 20 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 04 June Negative 
13 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 03 April First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ 06-07 April 1 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 15 July Reinf swab 20 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 











 Female 40-44 Health facility 08 August Reinf swab 21 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 03 July Positive 
15 Male 50-54 Contact tracing 22 April First pos swab 34 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 50-54 Contact tracing 23 July Reinf swab 21 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 22 July Negative 
16 Male 25-29 Health facility 09 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ 09-14 March† 5 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Contact tracing 21 May Reinf swab 21 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
17 Male 20-24 Health facility 15 May First pos swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Health facility 12 August Reinf swab 22 Not assessed§ 13 August 1 Not tested Unk 
18 Female 20-24 Health facility 23 May First pos swab 33 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Female 20-24 Health facility 07 August Reinf swab 22 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 02 August Negative 
19 Male 40-44 Health facility 03 June First pos swab 23 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Health facility 07 August Reinf swab 23 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 13 July Positive 
20 Female 45-49 Health facility 02 May First pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Female 45-49 Health facility 29 July Reinf swab 25 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 30 July Negative 
21 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 12 May First pos swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 27 July Reinf swab 25 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 28 July Positive 
22 Male 20-24 Health facility 31 May First pos swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Health facility 05 August Reinf swab 26 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
23 Male 20-24 Health facility 16 June First pos swab 31 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Contact tracing 11 August Reinf swab 27 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
24 Male 35-39 Health facility 08 June First pos swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Health facility 03 August Reinf swab 27 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
25 Male 40-44 Health facility 28 May First pos swab 21 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Contact tracing 30 July Reinf swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
26 Male 40-44 Survey‡ 22 April First pos swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Health facility 06 May Subs pos swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Health facility 14 May Subs pos swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Survey‡ 12 June Reinf swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
27 Male 25-29 Health facility 25 April First pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Health facility 10 June Reinf swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
28 Male 40-44 Health facility 11 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Contact tracing 08 June Reinf swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 10 July Positive 
29 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 12 May First pos swab 21 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 30 June Reinf swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
30 Male 15-19 Health facility 05 June First pos swab 20 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 15-19 Health facility 08 August Reinf swab 28 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
31 Male 35-39 Health facility 25 April First pos swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Survey‡ 22 June Reinf swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
32 Male 35-39 Survey‡ 12 May First pos swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Survey‡ 30 June Reinf swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
33 Male 40-44 Health facility 26 April First pos swab 17 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Health facility 06 July Reinf swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 











 Male 40-44 Contact tracing 28 July Reinf swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
35 Male 35-39 Health facility 17 May First pos swab 25 Not assessed§ 31 May-01 June  2 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Health facility 20 July Reinf swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 26 July Positive 
Good evidence for reinfection 
36 Male 30-34 Health facility 30 April First pos swab 22 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 26 June Reinf swab 30 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
37 Male 40-44 Health facility 04 May First pos swab 35 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Health facility 11 July Reinf swab 30 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
38 Male 25-29 Health facility 02 June First pos swab 35 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Contact tracing 04 August Reinf swab 30 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
39 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 06 May First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 10 May Subs pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 20 May Subs pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 30 June Reinf swab 30 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
40 Male 55-59 Health facility 10 March First pos swab Unk Mild  14-20 March† 7 Not tested Unk 
 Male 55-59 Health facility 03 June Reinf swab 31 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 22 July Positive 
41 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 23 April First pos swab 26 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Health facility 07 May Subs pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Survey‡ 12 June Reinf swab 31 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
42 Male 15-19 Health facility 10 April First pos swab 33 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 15-19 Health facility 26 May Reinf swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
43 Male 15-19 Health facility 09 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ 16-23 March† 8 Not tested Unk 
 Male 15-19 Contact tracing 26 May Reinf swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
44 Male 25-29 Survey‡ 26 April First pos swab 30 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Survey‡ 16 May Subs pos swab 34 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Survey‡ 20 June Reinf swab 32 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
45 Male 25-29 Contact tracing 26 April First pos swab 29 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 25-29 Contact tracing 23 June Reinf swab 33 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
46 Male 20-24 Health facility 23 April First pos swab 20 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Contact tracing 20 June Reinf swab 34 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
47 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 29 April First pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 20 June Reinf swab 34 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
48 Male 35-39 Health facility 08 April First pos swab 20 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 35-39 Health facility 16 June Reinf swab 35 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
49 Male 40-44 Survey‡ 06 April First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 40-44 Health facility 04 June Reinf swab 35 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
50 Male 50-54 Contact tracing 20 April First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 50-54 Contact tracing 11 June Reinf swab 35 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
51 Male 45-49 Health facility 21 April First pos swab 37 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 45-49 Survey‡ 19 June Reinf swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 02 August Positive 
52 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 29 March First pos swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 











53 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 20 April First pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
 Male 30-34 Contact tracing 04 June Reinf swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
54 Male 20-24 Health facility 11 April First pos swab 27 Not assessed§ 14-30 April† 17 Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Health facility 26 April Subs pos swab 36 Not assessed§ Inpatient -- Not tested Unk 
 Male 20-24 Survey‡ 24 June Reinf swab Unk Not assessed§ Not hospitalized 0 Not tested Unk 
Ab, antibody; LOS, length of stay; Reinf, reinfection; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; Pos, positive; Subs, subsequent; Unk, unknown. 
*Severity classification per WHO guidelines was conducted only on a subset of all cases where it was deemed relevant. Asymptomatic cases or cases with minimal symptoms were not formally assessed 
for severity.   
†It has been common to use hospitalization as a form of isolation especially early in the epidemic. 
‡The category “survey” refers to surveillance testing campaigns conducted in workplaces and residential areas. 
§Not assessed because of no or minimal symptoms to warrant clinical assessment. 














Table 2. Results of reinfection confirmatory analysis based on viral genome sequencing of the paired viral specimens of the first-
positive and reinfection swabs for 23 patients with strong or good epidemiological evidence for reinfection.  
Viral genome sequencing evidence for reinfection Indication upon comparing each genome pair N  
Insufficient evidence to warrant interpretation One or two genomes of low quality  11 
No evidence for reinfection One change of allele frequency  3 
Shifting balance of quasi-species with no evidence for reinfection Several changes of allele frequency  3 
Conclusive evidence for no reinfection Both genomes of high quality yet no differences found 2 
Supporting evidence for reinfection One genome of inferior quality but with D614G mutation 2 
Conclusive evidence for reinfection Multiple changes of allele frequency and D614G mutation 2 
Total   23 
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